1. Policy Issues and Prospects by Kozo Kunimune
1. Policy Issues and Prospects 
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing
Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
(IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
シリーズタイトル(英
)
Occasional Papers Series
シリーズ番号 39
journal or
publication title
Overcoming Asia's Currency and Financial
Crises: A Theoretical Investigation
page range 3-21
year 2004
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/00010627
1Policy Issues and Prospects
I. Introduction
The present volume examines the high interest rate policy intended to stave
off a currency crisis, banking policies for weathering a financial crisis, and
corporate restructuring policies for revitalizing economic activity. Theoretical
analyses were done using a wide range of analytical frameworks such as the
overshoot model of exchange rates, time inconsistency, the agency approach
for corporate finance, and comparative studies of financial systems.
This chapter reviews the issues that have been at the center of debate over
economic development and finance, providing an overview of policy issues
ranging from problems concerning the management of the macroeconomy to
matters of banking policy. The intent of this broad perspective is to give the
reader a clearer understanding of the questions that the succeeding chapters in
this study will deal with.
Section II, which follows, will review the function of the financial sector in
the economy. Section III gives a review of the relationship between economic
growth and finance. Section IV will discuss the significance of financial liber-
alization intended to foster the efficiency of the financial sector; it will also
look at the destabilization of the financial system that such liberalization
policies can induce. Following on this, Section V will discuss the vulnerabil-
ity of the financial system and policies for preventing financial crises, taking
up the problems of bank runs and moral hazard in bank management and the
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equally troublesome problem of macro shocks. Mismanagement of the
macroeconomy can be one cause for macro shocks, and Section VI discusses
a problem in the management of the macroeconomy known as the macroeco-
nomic trilemma. Based on the foregoing sections, Section VII will look at the
various policy issues of developing countries focusing on how extensive and
interrelated these are; it argues that the way policies are combined is impor-
tant. Finally, when studying financial and monetary issues, Section VIII points
out the need to consider the particular characteristics of the financial systems
in developing economies, which can be quite different from those of the
developed economies.
II. The Function of the Financial Sector
The significance of the financial industry can only be realized within the
context of the other industries in the economy. Thus when studying the role of
the financial sector, one has to view the economy in its entirety first, and then
look at the function of the financial sector within that wholeness.
In the modern economy, (1) The division of labor in the society and the
exchange of goods and services play a vital role. Instead of one person (or one
enterprise) making all of the goods he needs, people become specialized in
making specific goods for exchange; that way they can make more goods. (2)
Through the circulation of savings and investment, productivity can be raised
and maintained at higher levels. (Here investment means that going into
capital investment and other physical assets.) If there were no replacement
investment or investment into new capital goods, probably in thirty years time
a nation’s GDP would fall to zero. (3) Economic development is made pos-
sible by technological innovation which comes through the accumulation of
knowledge and R&D. This enables the production of more goods and services
with less inputs, and such activity is needed if totally new and previously
nonexisting goods and services are to be created. For all the above, the financial
sector provides a most important service in supporting the economic activity
of the other industrial sectors of the economy.
A. Settlement function
Specialization and the division of labor bring about the need for the ex-
change of goods and services, and one of the important functions of the
financial sector is to provide the means of settlement, i.e., money. Barter
transacting (the exchange of a good for another good without the medium of
money) is also possible, but in modern society almost all goods and services
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are exchanged through the medium of money (cash and bank deposits).
Important in the function of settling accounts is the concept of liquidity.
Liquidity is the easiness of exchanging (something) with other goods, ser-
vices or financial assets. For example, cash is extremely liquid in contrast to
real estate like land or buildings which has low liquidity. Something with high
liquidity is a natural medium for settling accounts. For example wage and
salary payments are often paid into bank savings accounts. Just imagine how
inconvenient it would be if a worker’s salary were paid in land equal to the
value of his salary. Therefore, highly liquid cash and bank deposits have
become the natural means for settling accounts.
B. Financial Intermediation
When savings exceed investments, it is called an excess of savings; when
the opposite is true, it is an excess of investment. At different times enterprises
as well as individual households experience these excesses. But on average
households tend to have an excess of savings while enterprises an excess of
investment. Therefore there has to be some sort of intermediary between the
excess savers and the excess investors to keep up the circulation of funds.
Such intermediation is another important function of the financial sector, and
it is called financial intermediation.
When this intermediation is done by banks, it means gathering deposits
from a large number of depositors and lending this money to companies as a
source of capital investment or to individuals as housing investment. Interme-
diation where banks stand in the middle as the collectors and the lenders of
funds is called indirect financing. The underwriting business of securities
companies, which involves mediating in the sale of new corporate stocks and
bonds, is also financial intermediation. However, in this case, although these
companies sometimes temporarily purchase the newly issued stocks and bonds,
ultimately they are sold to ordinary investors. In this way, the investor as the
provider of the funds forms a direct ownership or lending/borrowing relation-
ship with the enterprise as the ultimate user of the funds. Therefore this
financial intermediation in the sale of corporate stocks and bonds is called
direct financing and is distinguished from indirect financing which is con-
ducted through the intermediation of banks.
C. Assets Transformation
The transformation of assets means changing the character of assets, such
as their risk, maturity, liquidity, and units of transaction. For example, the
character of bank deposits is low risk, short maturity, high liquidity, and
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usually small-scale. But bank loans that are made using the funds from bank
deposits have a different character. They carry the credit risk of the borrower,
have mid- to long-term maturity, have low liquidity, and are usually large-
scale.
Technological innovation and the creation of new industries can produce
substantial benefits once they have been successful, but they also have a high
possibility of failure. In order to collect sufficient funds for these kinds of
ventures, there have to be financial services such as investment trusts which
can diversify investment risks. Also it will take time before the financing and
equity participation in these new businesses start to produce profits, so they
are essentially low in liquidity, meaning they cannot quickly be realized.
However, if something like investment trusts can be bought and sold, then
investors can secure a certain degree of liquidity. (Of course liquidity is the
highest when financial institutions collect deposits and lend the funds out, but
it is difficult to finance extremely high risk ventures with such funds.) In this
manner, by providing services to transform assets, the financial sector makes
it easier to pursue technological innovation and create new industries.
In performing the above function, an important responsibility of the financial
sector is the management of risk, production of information, and monitoring
loans. Risk management includes reducing the risk of losses arising from bad
loans (the management of credit risk), reducing the risk of losses caused by
interest rate fluctuations (the management of interest rate risk), and providing
for unexpected withdrawals of bank deposits (the management of liquidity
risk). Information production means ascertaining what ventures look promis-
ing for investment, and monitoring borrowers is necessary to make sure they
use the loaned funds properly. In all of these tasks economies of scale are at
work. When a lender has made a large number of loans, if one goes bad it has
little overall effect on the lender (risk is diversified). And rather than having a
large number of petty creditors trying to watch over and monitor a number of
individual borrowers, it is much more efficient to delegate such monitoring
responsibility to a small number of large-scale creditors. The same can be said
for the production of information. Thus it is rational to turn over such tasks to
specialized financial institutions.1
III. Finance and Economic Growth
Through the various functions discussed above, the financial sector is inter-
connected with real economic activity and plays a role in smoothing this
activity. There is now an accumulation of theoretical and empirical research
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on finance and economic growth. This accumulation of research has increas-
ingly brought to the fore the importance of the financial sector in the economy.
Theoretical studies have shown (and this point will be dealt with in more
detail in Chapter 3, Section II) that the financial system provides the economy
with the necessary liquidity (or strictly speaking, it economizes the usage of
liquidity) and directs more funds to long-term investment thereby promoting
economic growth (Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Bencivenga and Smith 1991;
Bencivenga Smith and Starr 1995).
It has also been shown that the financial system assists a variety of eco-
nomic entities in the management of risk. Above mentioned economization of
liquidity is achieved by financial intermediaries through the diversification of
liquidity risks (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). Moreover, by controlling the
risks associated with production, it becomes easier for these institutions to
invest from a long-term perspective (Levine 1992; Saint-Paul 1992; Devereux
and Smith 1994; Obstfeld 1994).
Studies also indicate that the financial system contributes to economic
development by solving (or mitigating) the problem of information asymme-
try. If, for example, the financial system can provide information to potential
investors about more efficient entrepreneurs and investment plans, the amount
and efficiency of investment increases which promotes economic develop-
ment (Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990). Likewise the provision of informa-
tion about promising new technology promotes economic development (King
and Levine 1993b).
From empirical studies it has been confirmed that development of the
financial sector promotes the growth of the economy. While it has been known
for some time that there is a positive correlation between the development of
the financial sector and the growth of the economy, the causal relationship of
the two had not been clearly understood. However, since the pioneering re-
search by King and Levine (1993a, b), many studies have been carried out
confirming that growth of the financial sector causes growth of the economy.
(For a survey of the theoretical and empirical research, see Levine [1997]; for
the empirical research since then, see World Bank [2001].)
Following this theoretical and empirical confirmation of financial-sector
development promoting economic growth, research interest turned to examin-
ing the relationship between differences in financial systems and economic
growth and efficiency. Much of this research has compared bank-based financial
systems, where banks in particular play a major role as financial intermediar-
ies, with market-based financial systems, where the financial market (particu-
larly the stock and bond markets) plays a major role (Allen and Gale 2000).
In Chapter 3 of this volume, a model analysis is performed on this compari-
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son of financial systems. The analysis makes a strong case that when a devel-
oping country is in the early stage of economic development, policies to foster
a bank-based financial system can be justified on the basis of institution-
building costs; however, the system is susceptible to currency or financial crisis.
IV. The Theory of Financial Liberalization
As is apparent from the foregoing sections, the financial sector performs many
important functions in the economy, and for this reason policies to foster this
sector need to be incorporated into economic development strategies. How-
ever, for a time after World War II the importance of fostering the financial
sector was not sufficiently recognized, and for several decades it was encum-
bered by restrictive policies.
Following World War II governments in developing countries were advised
to actively intervene in the economy. Through regulations and the nationaliza-
tion of banks, governments used the financial system for taxation purposes
and for providing subsidies to designated sectors of the economy.
In order to direct subsidies to designated industrial sectors, banks were
forced to lend at very low interest rates to designated protected sectors. In a
similar way, forced lending went into low-interest home loans to encourage
household home ownership, and into debt-ridden state-owned enterprises to
maintain employment. And to support their deficit financing, governments
forced banks to buy government bonds at low prices and imposed high reserve
requirements.
Such direct, systematic government intervention in the financial sector
became known as “financial repression.” It curtailed the autonomy that banks
had over their business operations and decision making. Deposit interest rate
was also regulated and kept low. It taxed depositors to accumulate financial
resources which the government at its own discretion funneled as subsidies to
designated industrial sectors. To avoid taxes, depositors reduced the amount
of their bank accounts. For banks there was no need to have good judgment
about the quality of lending. As a result, financial repression led to the stagna-
tion of bank intermediation functions and the inefficient allocation of financial
resources (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973; World Bank 1989).
To rectify the policy approaches that led to financial repression, a “theory of
financial liberalization”2 arose which argued that liberalizing the financial
sector would promote the development of the sector which would bring about
the growth of the economy. Such liberalization, it was argued, would facilitate
the creation of a competitive market environment, and in such a market the
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volume of financial intermediation and efficiency would rise (Shaw 1973).
Also the fragmented financial market would move toward integration which
would lower financial costs, increase investing, and make the rates of return
on investments more uniform across industrial sectors and among enterprises
(McKinnon 1973). This in turn would lead to a rise in the rate of investment
and in marginal productivity and thus to a rise in economic growth.3
The importance that the theory of financial liberalization puts on the devel-
opment of the financial sector is fundamentally correct, and many countries
have put its arguments into practice. Along with the developed economies,
from the 1970s developing countries also embarked on financial liberaliza-
tion. Over time the interventionist policies of earlier governments were phased
out; interest-rate controls, preferential lending regulations, entry barriers into
financial businesses, regulations on international financial transactions—these
and other measures of financial repression were abolished.
However, financial liberalization in practice brought along its own prob-
lems. The biggest was that liberalized financial systems were more prone to
financial crises than the old illiberal systems had been. Countries continued to
introduce financial liberalization policies even into the 1990s, but the progress
of these policies has been very uneven. Liberalization since the latter half of
the 1970s has brought on bank failures in many countries and exposed bank-
ing systems to crisis and collapse (Sundarajaran and Baliño 1991; Vittas 1992;
Caprio et al. 1994). An analysis of 69 countries which included the advanced
countries was conducted by Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, pp. 9–10) and re-
vealed that from the 1970s until the time of the survey there had been 80
instances of bank insolvencies, and the financial systems in 58 countries had
experienced crises. When incomplete data from countries with transition econo-
mies was included, bringing the survey up to 90 countries, then more than 100
instances of bank insolvency were found.
The mixed results of financial liberalization indicate that although develop-
ment of the financial sector, as advocated by financial liberalization theory,
has been the correct course to pursue, there has been insufficient recognition
of the inherent vulnerability of the financial sector and the need for policies to
deal with this vulnerability.
V. Financial System Vulnerability
A. Vulnerable to Bank Runs
As stated above, one of the important functions of financial institutions,
especially banks, is financial intermediation. As financial intermediaries, banks
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provide relatively safe assets, i.e., deposits, and assume relatively risky assets,
i.e., loan. Therefore, economic shocks that cause fluctuations in the value of
bank loans may destabilize the financial system.4
Shocks that cause fluctuations in the value of bank loans can be divided into
macro shocks, where risks cannot be dispersed, and idiosyncratic shocks
where risks can be dispersed. Looking first at idiosyncratic shocks, which
have no statistical correlation with one another, the risk of fluctuations in the
returns on lending can be diversified by spreading lending over a large number
of firms (Diamond 1984). But even if a bank has dispersed its lending over a
sufficiently large number of firms, there always remains the possibility that a
sudden unforeseen run on deposits could bring the bank down.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) assumed that (1) returns on long-term invest-
ments are high, but they are low if such investments are terminated early; (2)
depositors may be compelled to liquidate their deposits in a short period of
time (liquidity risk). Whether or not individual depositors will need to with-
draw their deposits is an assumed uncertainty, which means that there is the
possibility that depositors will prematurely cancel their bank accounts. Be-
cause of this risk, banks cannot undertake long-term investments which have
higher rates of return. However, this risk can be reduced when the number of
depositors is large in which case banks can quite accurately estimate the
amount of withdrawals from bank deposits. Banks can then hold back enough
liquidity (such as cash) to cover the amount of estimated withdrawals, and all
of the remaining amount from deposits can be used to finance long-term
investments which will provide higher rates of return. In this way banks are
able to fulfill simultaneously the two needs of supplying liquidity and supply-
ing funds for long-term investment.
However, what happens if many more depositors than the bank estimated
want to withdraw their money all at once? The bank has to prematurely
terminate that amount it has put into long-term investments and use it to meet
deposit withdrawals. But this means receiving lower rates of return on invest-
ment than had been expected, and in a worst case situation the bank could
suffer a capital deficit. Because of this possibility, when many depositors start
to withdraw their money, those who normally would not have withdrawn their
money will also hastily withdraw their deposits for reasons of safety. This is
because the bank may not have enough funds remaining to pay the last deposi-
tors wanting to take out their money. In this sense banks are inherently weak
against bank runs; and because of this, it does not matter how substantial or
insubstantial the cause for a bank run, once a run on deposits has begun, it
becomes rational behavior for all depositors to become involved and rush to
withdraw their money. Thus something as insubstantial as a groundless rumor
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can cause a bank run. Moreover the failure of a single bank can cause a chain
of bank runs which lead to a collapse of entire banking system.
B. Moral Hazard
The term moral hazard originated in the insurance business where it has
long been noticed that people become more complacent about fire prevention
after they have taken out fire insurance. In the field of corporate finance it is
known that stockholders in limited liability enterprises which hold debts tend
to become lax about the danger of business failure, and the greater the borrow-
ing the greater the tendency for this behavior to happen. This is because under
the limited liability, when a company becomes insolvent, the stockholders
cannot be held financially responsible for more than the amount of their own
equity participation. This creates an incentive to borrow large amounts and
invest in high-risk, high-return ventures where the danger of failure is high but
the rewards of success are very large. This is because their profits are very
high when they are successful, but their losses are limited if they fail.5
In the case of banks, their borrowing (i.e., deposits) is extremely large.
Therefore the banking business can be susceptible to moral hazard. With
ordinary companies creditors can control for this danger by strengthening
monitoring. But with banks where deposits are protected by deposit insurance
and banks are implicitly protected by government policies, depositors (i.e.,
the banks’ creditors) can hardly be expected to oversee and supervise bank
behavior. For this reason moral hazard can occur; bank management can put a
growing amount of bank assets into high-risk high-return loans, which will
increase the possibility of bank failure.
Financial liberalization can make moral hazard a more serious problem.
Liberalization increases the intensity of competition among banks and pushes
down profitability. It also lowers the walls separating the banking business
from other nonbank financial institutions, and this aspect also increases com-
petition and lowers profits. These changes have taken away the excess profits
that banks used to enjoy. Hellmann, Murdoc, and Stiglitz (1997) call these
excess profits “franchise value.”
According to their argument, if franchise value can increase the value of the
bank as a going concern, then this factor can be expected to restrain excess
risk taking by banks. From the viewpoint of bank management, the opportu-
nity cost of losing banking business rises as high as franchise value (if they
conduct other business, they cannot earn as much excess profit as in the
banking business). Fearing the loss of business, bank managers become con-
servative about assuming risks, and in this way moral hazard can be avoided.
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In recent years a “franchise value hypothesis” has been put forward which
seeks to maintain the soundness of bank business operations while at the same
time recognizing the need to improve the government’s ability to regulate
banks.6
For developing country governments with insufficient regulatory capabil-
ity, this hypothesis of restraining risk burden through franchise value is a very
attractive argument. In developing countries with limited ability to regulate
the banking sector, it is difficult to enforce prudential regulations and the
disclosure of information, and a mid- to long-term timeframe will be needed
to accumulate the required human resources and set up the related legal
framework needed to solve this problem.
However, the hypothesis also contains a number of problems which have to
be solved. Limiting competition weakens market discipline leading to welfare
loss because inefficient banks are allowed to survive. Moreover, there can be
collusion between banks and regulatory authorities. Thus, for franchise value
to work as a restraint on excess risk burden, there has to be more than just
having the regulatory authorities collect information about the business op-
erations of banks; there also needs to be a separate mechanism set up that
watches over the behavior and honesty of the regulatory authorities. In es-
sence what is needed is a framework that brings discipline to the regulatory
authorities themselves, as well as discipline to the bank shareholders through
the creation of franchise value.7
C. Macro Shocks
Although prone to moral hazard, it is also argued that the banking industry
has within itself the means to restrain this hazard. Diamond (1984) argued that
by dispersing their lending across a sufficiently large number of diverse bor-
rowers, banks could reduce their loan-assets risk to the smallest degree pos-
sible and thereby prevent moral hazard.
However, risks that can be reduced in this way are those specific to indi-
vidual companies. Macro risks, those that affect the profitability of all compa-
nies (the whole economy) simultaneously, cannot be reduced by the disper-
sion of lending. As the amount of aggregate lending increases, the level of risk
also grows. Some examples of macro shocks are such things as government
mismanagement of the macroeconomy, a sudden rise in foreign interest rates,
or the collapse of exchange rates (a currency crisis). They are events that
affect the entire economy and which are difficult for individual economic
entities to avoid.
Suppose for example that a bank’s lending has been given in small amounts
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to companies working in a variety of industries such as steel, chemicals,
electric machinery, and automobile manufacturing. In a normal economic
environment (meaning there are no macro shocks), if the performance of the
steel industry were to slip while the other industries remained healthy, it
would be highly unlikely that the bank would suffer a huge loss on its overall
lending. This is the reduction of risk through the dispersion of investment.
However, if a government mismanages macroeconomic policy, or if there is a
currency or financial crisis, there can be a slump in the business performance
of all the industries, and in this situation the dispersion of investments will not
be effective in protecting the bank’s loans. This is the situation with a macro
shock.
In a banking crisis the financial system’s account-settlement mechanism
stops functioning and financial intermediation stagnates causing a severe nega-
tive impact on the overall economy.8 For this reason, it is imperative that a
repeat of such crises be avoided. Researchers have learned a number of les-
sons from the failures experienced in financial liberalization during the 1970s
and 1980s.9 For example, the mismanagement of financial liberalization among
the countries in South America, know as the “Southern Cone experiments,”
made it clear that there has to be macroeconomic stability, because there is no
way even efficient banks can avoid macro shocks.10
An important element in protecting banks against runs is the function of a
central bank as “lender of last resort,” and in most countries this has come to
be recognized as one of the roles of a central bank. Regulations pertaining to
the soundness of the financial sector (prudential regulations) are important for
dealing with the problem of moral hazard,11 and there are also the standards
set down by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) which provide
reference for developing countries. But few standards of reference have been
established and little systematic research has been done concerning measures
for dealing with macro shocks. One reason for this is because analysis of bank
behavior has been in the field of microeconomics, and the study of macro
shocks and their effects has tended to be taken out of the field.
It is widely accepted, however, that bank behavior can be a factor for
causing a macro shock. The now well-established expression “credit crunch”
is used to describe a change in bank behavior that has an adverse impact on
economic activity. When bank financial conditions deteriorate because of
growing bad loans, banks become reluctant to lend, and this becomes the
cause for an economic slowdown and an impediment to recovery. While
opinions are divided among researchers over how serious a problem a credit
crunch was in the different economies of Asia in the aftermath of the currency
crisis (Domac and Ferri 1998; Ghosh and Ghosh 1998; Ferri and Kang 1999;
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Kim 1999), it is quite certain that such a contraction of credit at the start of the
crisis worsened conditions. Following the initial rapid deterioration of the
economies, however, there was a fall in demand for financing, and it may be
that a borrowing contraction rather than a credit crunch became an important
factor for prolonging Asia’s economic slump. In a post-crisis study, Demirguc-
Kunt, Detragiache, and Gupta (2000) argue that after the currency crisis, the
economies in Asia began to recover even without an accompanying expansion
of credit. The model analysis in Chapter 6 of this volume indicates that
companies in difficult financial straits try to avoid relying on bank credit as a
means for procuring funds. Thus it is highly possible that a reluctance to
borrow rather than a reluctance to lend was a major cause for the credit
contraction after the crisis.
By recognizing that either the behavior of banks or the behavior of compa-
nies can have impact on the macroeconomy, it can be seen that macro shocks
and the changes in the microeconomic behavior of banks and companies that
these shocks induce have a circular interaction that can lead to a spiral wors-
ening of the economy.
In addition to these, government mismanagement of the macroeconomy
will also cause unintentional fluctuations in the macroeconomy (i.e., macro
shocks) which can bring on a financial crisis. Financial liberalization, particu-
larly liberalization of international financial transactions as part of a program
to liberalize the financial sector, can make management of the macroeconomy
more difficult and lead to a macro shock. The next section will look at this
aspect as it is related to the macroeconomic “trilemma.”
VI. The Macroeconomic “Trilemma”
The macroeconomic trilemma12 is the argument that a government cannot
achieve all three policy objectives of maintaining a stable exchange rate,
independent monetary policy, and full convertibility (liberalizing the interna-
tional transaction of capital). Two of the three can be achieved, but one always
has to be given up. This can be thought of as something of a macroeconomic
game of musical chairs. There are three players but only two chairs.
For policymakers it is a matter of choosing from three alternatives depend-
ing on which one of the objectives is given up. If they choose to give up
maintaining a stable exchange rate, then they have to deal with a floating
exchange rate system. For countries with small domestic economies that
depended greatly on importing and exporting (such as Malaysia where the
total value of imports and export is as much as 200 per cent of GDP in 1998),
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this can be an unpleasant choice. If policymakers choose to give up indepen-
dent monetary policy, should a situation like a currency crisis arise which puts
severe downward pressure on exchange rates, interest rates will have to be
raised to intolerably high levels even if only temporarily. This of course will
have an extremely bad impact on the domestic economy, and such a situation
is often the trigger setting off a financial crisis. If policymakers choose to give
up full convertibility, it means introducing restrictions on the international
transacting of capital (or “capital control”). But capital control raises govern-
ment administrative costs, which opens the way for corruption and a black
market. It also means that the country should expect a fall in the inflow of
foreign capital. This can be a problematic outcome for a developing country
that needs more capital for economic development.
The trilemma means that a government cannot pursue a stable exchange
rate policy without accepting restrictions in another area. Because policymakers
have to tolerate one of the three evils: fluctuating exchange rates, fluctuating
interest rates, or capital controls, if they want to avoid fluctuating exchange
rates, they will have to choose between tolerating interest-rate fluctuations or
having to delay liberalizing capital transactions.
The trilemma for policymakers is that whichever choice they make, they
will have to sacrifice something; there is no panacea. Which choice is best and
which sacrifice is least adverse will depend on the country and its situation.
For a long time after World War II, international capital movement was only
on a small scale, and the problem of the trilemma was not greatly discussed.
But this changed particularly during the 1990s when the volume of interna-
tional capital flow rose quickly, much of it pouring into a number of develop-
ing countries.
VII. The Difficulty of Combining Policies
The existence of this trilemma adds to the difficulties facing developing coun-
tries when trying to combine and coordinate economic policies. Figure 1-1
brings together the views of international macroeconomics, macroeconomics,
financial economics, and development finance theory, and diagrams the inter-
relationship of policy problems that developing countries must deal with.
When viewed through the trilemma, it means that policymakers are forced to
make the choice of tolerating either fluctuating exchange rates, fluctuating
interest rates, or capital controls. If they allow exchange rates to fluctuate, that
can be a cause for a supply shock to the macroeconomy.13 If they accept
fluctuating interest rates, they will lose independence of monetary policy
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which is an important device of macroeconomic policy. Both of these have an
adverse impact on the stability of the macroeconomy. If policymakers decide
to accept capital controls, this will reduce the amount of foreign capital that
can be used for economic development. It also runs counter to financial
liberalization policy which is meant to strengthen the operations of the financial
system. If raising the efficiency of the financial sector is the only consider-
ation, then abolishing capital controls and promoting the sector’s integration
into the world market will increase the volume of funding to the economy, and
it can also be expected to accelerate competition in the financial sector.14
Financial liberalization is certainly valid as a theory, but when policies
based on this theory are dogmatically applied without consideration of the
vulnerability of the banking sector, it can lead to a financial crisis. For ex-
ample, when the economy is suffering the effects of a supply shock such as a
currency crisis, it is wise to avoid any policy which could raise banking-sector
vulnerability. Unfortunately, in Indonesia in November 1997 such a situation
developed into a bank run against the entire banking system, which definitely
worsened the country’s economic instability, because the government care-
lessly suspended the operation of several inefficient banks in the midst of the
currency crisis (Radelet and Sachs 1998a, b). In short, governments have to
avoid the folly of combining policies with mutually negative synergies and
can give rise to a vicious circle.
To cope with the outbreak of a financial crisis, policymakers have to put
into effect measures that will produce positive synergies. For example, by
combining economic recovery policy with financial restructuring policy can
the greatest synergies be manifested. However, because a recovery of the
economy takes away the will to carry out economic restructuring, there are
those who argue that economic recover should be deferred until after restruc-
turing has been carried out. This is hardly realistic, however, because financial
restructuring, especially the disposal of nonperforming loans, is extremely
difficult while the economy remains depressed.
It is important to recognize the importance of the trilemma and to under-
stand that “there is no perfect choice.” Viewed the other way around, it means
that there are various ways of dealing with the same problem. To cope with the
East Asian currency crisis, for example, the IMF’s approach was to favor high
interest rate policy. On the other hand, Malaysia in September 1998 decided to
impose capital controls which attracted a good deal of attention and criticism.
Meanwhile there were economists who argued that the only thing necessary
for overcoming the crisis was to let exchange rates drop (meaning introducing
a totally free floating exchange rate system) (Sachs 1997). Each of these
approaches was one of the choices within the trilemma and a valid choice.
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When choosing which policy is the most appropriate for dealing with the
current problems of the economy, it is better if policymakers take a case-by-
case approach. Chapter 2 in this volume looks at the problems that high
interest rate policy caused during the Asian currency crisis and shows that it
was not the best choice for coping with the situation.
A very important point when applying policies is to keep a sense of balance
between economic theory and policy perspective. Economic theory is insight-
ful and instructive, but its focus is sometimes on a very limited area. On the
other hand, managing policy in the real world requires an all-encompassing
perspective. Academic research is divided into specialized fields, but when
dealing with the actual policy issues facing developing countries, policymakers
must take this compartmentalized academic knowledge and apply it to the
policy issues with comprehensive understanding. Also in economic theory
there are vogues. When certain theories are prevailing, the study of certain
problems gets overemphasized while research on other important issues lan-
guishes.
As the review in the Section V indicated, most of the concern in the debate
over the vulnerability of the financial system has been over the question of
“What is the best way to prevent a financial crisis?” Meanwhile, the question
of “What is the best way of overcoming a financial crisis after it has broken
out?” has not attracted much research. With this in mind, Chapters 4–6 in this
volume examine the problems of dealing with financial crises from an ex post
perspective which is how policymakers have to confront them in the real
world.
VIII. The Specific Characteristics of Financial Systems in Devel-
oping Economies
When studying the economic problems of developing countries, researchers
need to take into consideration the characteristics of their economies that are
different from those of the developed countries. For example, differences in
initial conditions when a country embarks on economic development can
matter when considering policy consequences.15
At the initial stage of liberalization, there are some important differences
between developed and developing countries; these include the financial con-
ditions of banks, the skill and knowhow of banks and regulatory authorities,
the development of the legal system, and the fineness of information about
borrowers. If the capital adequacy ratio of banks is low when liberalization is
carried out, bank shareholders will probably take excessive risk, which will
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increase the possibility of banks incurring capital deficits.
Under financial repression, banks were not compelled to build up skills and
knowhow, and in many banks credit screening became careless, and there was
insufficient monitoring of borrowers. Restrictions on bank autonomy and
bank regulations that were at the discretion of the government reduced the
importance of accumulating knowledge and human capital through the expe-
rience of doing business in financial intermediation, and they became under-
lying reasons for the failure of financial liberalization (Ikeo 1996a). But even
when banks have the needed human and physical capital, at the initial stage
immediately after the start of liberalization, banks may suffer from a defi-
ciency of information available about the credit worthiness of borrowers and
the state of their past loans. With no information, banks have no other choice
than to lend at high rates of interest that cover risk. This may cause them to
select adverse borrowers (those of bad quality), which is known as “adverse
selection.”
Financial repression removed the opportunity for governments and their
regulatory authorities to accumulate the skills and knowhow needed for financial
administration. Under financial repression, nonperforming loans could be
liquidated through the rents collected by the government, therefore there was
no need for regulatory authorities to assess the quality of bank assets. More-
over, regulations limiting competition narrowed the scope of the market where
banks could operate, which made it easier to assess the quality of bank assets
than under free market transactions. Like the banks, in countries where financial
repression continued longer, the administrative ability of the regulatory au-
thorities developed less; there was less accumulation of skills and knowhow.
This made it more difficult to assess the quality of bank assets accurately, and
to introduce corrective measures in a quick and precise way.
When liquidating a failed bank, the interests of the various stakeholders
have to be reconciled, but if the legal system is underdeveloped, which is a
characteristic of developing countries, this can retard the start of corrective
measures and raise the costs of liquidation. In order for regulatory authorities
to perform their expected functions, the legal standing of these authorities
have to be clarified, and they need to be shut off from political intervention
and from law suits by stockholders and other bank interest groups.
Chapter 5 of this volume deals with government policies to rescue banks. It
examines the problem of moral hazard and the concern that bank bailout
policies lead to such hazard. The chapter shows that differences in the pre-
paredness for financial crises and differences in their anticipated macro shocks
require that there be different approaches for dealing with the problem of
moral hazard.
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The existence of an informal financial market is another characteristic that
is widely seen in developing countries. It can take a variety of forms ranging
from mutual financing, and money lenders, to financing among relatives and
acquaintances. At one time among researchers the existence of an informal
financial market simply indicated that a financial system was immature. But
there has been a reexamination of this perception from the standpoint of the
economics of information, and it is now seen that this market also functions as
a mechanism for overcoming such problems as the asymmetry of information,
the absence of means for enforcing contract compliance, a deficient insurance
market, and high transaction costs (Braverman and Stiglitz 1982; Kotwai
1985; Bell 1988; Hoff and Stiglitz 1990; Bardhan and Udry 1999). Neverthe-
less, an informal financial market cannot substitute completely for a formal
financial market (World Bank 2001, Chap. 1), and it is significant for eco-
nomic development that the financial sector be fostered in order to bring about
the integration of a fragmented financial market.
But even with integration, the problem of asymmetrical information still is
a major concern. Integration makes the market larger, and the scope of eco-
nomic transactions expands from inside to outside the community. It becomes
more difficult for transactors to obtain information and enforce contract com-
pliance, and there is a greater possibility that borrowers will default. In small-
scale entities like farming villages or local ethnic Chinese business groups, it
is possible to obtain nearly perfect information and close to unlimited liability
when transactions are limited to within the community, and these act as a
strong safeguard against problems like moral hazard.16 However, when the
scope of transactions expands beyond the community, the fineness of infor-
mation deteriorates, legal penalties against default become weaker, and the
liability of a borrower becomes more limited. Therefore, if no conscious effort
is made to obtain information about borrowers and oversee loans, if penalties
for defaulting are not clearly codified, then the expanded scope of transactions
that comes with the economic development of a society will weaken the
framework of control that disciplines the behavior of borrowers.
Furthermore, on the matter of financial policy, there is also the argument
that the short-term financial market in developing countries is not developed,
and because this market has to be the basis for implementing financial policy,
its underdevelopment limits the effectiveness of this policy.17 This characteris-
tic of developing economies can also be a factor for destabilizing the
macroeconomy (Kunimune 1998a).
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Notes
This chapter with revisions and updates is based on the following studies: Kunimune
(2000d) and K$oz $o Kunimune and Seir $o It$o, “S$oron” [Introduction], in Watanabe
(1998). I would like to express my appreciation to Mr. It$o as coauthor who gladly
consented to the revisions of our article for use in this volume.
1 Freixas and Rochet (1997) is a detailed study of the role played by banks.
2 Concerning the theory of financial liberation, see Fry (1995) and Kunimune
(1997).
3 Within the context of the endogenous growth theory, economic growth will rise
when the greater part of capital accumulation goes into investment projects in the
order of the highest rates of return.
4 If the risk associated with financial intermediation can lead to bank failures, one
can wonder why banks that carry out the important task of settling accounts are
permitted to undertake intermediation. If banks were separated into those that
invested in safe assets like government bonds and those that undertook the risk-
prone function of financial intermediation, such failures would be less likely to
arise.
Unlike banks that undertake both financial intermediation and account settling,
banks that handle only account settlements are called “narrow banks.” If such
banks hold safe assets marketable on the secondary market, such as government
bonds, that are of the same amount as the amount of their deposits, they can avoid
insolvency and liquidity problems. For a discussion of narrow banks, see for
example Goodhart (1987).
5 See Black and Scholes (1973) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). As debt ratio
increases, the tendency becomes greater to invest in high-risk, high-return ven-
tures. This is because the payoff function for residual claimants is convex.
6 For example, Rojas-Suaréz and Weisbrod (1995, p. 8) say that the source of
franchise value for commercial banks in developing countries is in providing
means of payment. Reasons for this include the fact that the value of the bank’s
deposits are backed by the bank’s exclusive access to the discount window privi-
leges of the central bank, and because of the lack of trust in other means of
payment.
7 There is also the concern about the distortion effects in long-term resource alloca-
tion. Although the franchise values hypothesis shows that it is possible to improve
static resource allocation, in the dynamic sense it fails to give sufficient consider-
ation to the accumulation of human resources within banks, the accumulation of
knowledge for the development of new products, and the accumulation of produc-
tion factors.
8 When a banking crisis becomes inevitable, it decreases the money supply which
adversely affects economic activity (Friedman and Schwartz 1973). Moreover, in
a banking crisis, the production of information stops, and small and medium-
21POLICY ISSUES AND PROSPECTS
sized firms as well as individuals without established reputations and credit rat-
ings have difficulty in obtaining financing. This is the nonmonetary effect of a
banking crisis (Bernanke 1983).
9 See, for example, World Bank (1989) and the references therein; also Lindgren,
Garcia, and Saal (1996). There are many comprehensive analyses of earlier financial
crises in advanced countries; see, for example, Kindleberger (1991), Calomiris
and Gorton (1991).
10 However, in the time of a banking crisis, it is hard to determine which of the
shocks is the important one. About the only sure thing that past experience shows
is that banks with an accumulation of nonperforming loans because of the poor
dispersion of idiosyncratic risks can easily find themselves deep in excess debt
because of a macro shock. Therefore, when dealing with the matter of macro
shocks, it is vital to question the correctness of government macroeconomic
policy, and equally important to ask banks how much effort they are making to
disperse idiosyncratic risk and what incentives there have been for them to make
this effort.
11 See Dewatripont and Tirole (1994).
12 Also called the “irreconcilable trinity” and “inconsistent trinity,” this problem has
long been known in the field of international macroeconomics (see for example
Wallich 1972). Following the Asian currency crisis, Krugman (1998, 1999) and
others focused renewed attention on this trilemma.
13 However, the strong-dollar weak-yen effect acted as a supply shock to the ASEAN
economies which followed a system of pegging local currencies to the U.S. dollar.
Thus even a fixed exchange rate system cannot always completely stop supply
shocks that come in from the outside.
14 World Bank (2000, Chap. 4), which goes into this issue much more deeply,
maintains that governments should give their approval to the entry of foreign
banks into the domestic economy. But in the opinion of this author, there needs to
be a more thorough and careful debate about the desirability of such policy.
15 See Caprio (1994) for an analysis focusing on the conditions at the initial stage of
liberalization. Caprio points out the possibility that a rise in interest rates due to
the interest-rate liberalization will raise bank loan portfolio risks, that lending will
decline when there is an insufficient accumulation of information, and that
nonperforming loans will accumulate when there is insufficient human capital.
16 In recent years there has been a large amount of research that has studied the
efficiency of rural finance focusing on the asymmetry of information and contract
compliance. See, for example, the studies in World Bank Economic Review, Sep-
tember 1990.
17 See for example Masuda (1998), Agenor and Montiel (1996).
